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LEONARD NELSON AND METAPHYSICAL KNOWLEDGE 
AGAINST THE NEO-KANTIAN BACKGROUND  
– Tomasz Kubalica – 
Abstract. Leonard Nelson is known primarily as a critic of epistemology in the Neo-Kantian mean-
ing of the term. The aim of this paper is to investigate the presuppositions and consequences of his 
critique. I claim that what has rarely been discussed in this context is the problem of the possibility 
of metaphysics. By the impossibility of epistemology Nelson means the possibility of metaphysical 
knowledge. I intend to devote this paper to the analysis of this problem in relation to the Neo- 
-Kantian background. 
Keywords: Leonard Nelson, Neo-Kantianism, metaphysics, epistemology, knowledge. 
Leonard Nelson was a popular philosopher in the first three decades of 
the twentieth century, whose importance faded with the eclipse of Neo- 
-Kantianism. Recently, a significant increase in the interest in Neo-Kantianism 
can be noticed. This research is part of an important trend in contemporary 
philosophical historiography and systematic exploration of contemporary phi-
losophy. This paper aims to shed new light on the psychological trend in the 
development of Neo-Kantian philosophy, especially Leonard Nelson’s theo-
retical philosophy with regard to his attitude to the problem of possibility in 
the theory of knowledge (epistemology). In my opinion, despite the stereo-
types and simplifications concerning the epistemological nature of Neo- 
-Kantian philosophy, it did not lack deep metaphysical reflection that took 
a critical look at epistemology. This can be seen, for example, in the philoso-
phy of a well-known representative of the psychological trend of Neo- 
-Kantianism, Leonard Nelson. On the basis of Nelson’s views, I am going to 
demonstrate that metaphysical considerations and the advanced criticism of 
epistemology appeared in Neo-Kantian philosophy long before the new on-
tology of Emil Lask, Martin Heidegger and Nicolai Hartmann. 
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Leonard Nelson’s criticism of epistemology was demonstrated by Jan 
Woleński.1 Woleński examined Nelson’s two arguments against the possibility 
of epistemology, putting them into a more contemporary perspective against 
the background of the controversies concerning the concept of epistemology 
and knowledge, together with the question of epistemic justification. Using 
a similar approach to that of Woleński, Hans-Johann Glock2 considered the 
problem of situating Nelson’s philosophy within analytic philosophy. Nel-
son’s problem of epistemic justification was also analyzed by Reinhard 
Kleinknecht and Jörg Schroth,3,4 who took a similar perspective. The problem 
of the possibility of epistemology (the theory of knowledge) was taken up by 
Piotr Waszczenko, Roderick M. Chisholm and Rudolf Haller.5 Waszczenko 
considered Nelson’s concept of epistemology. Haller and Chisholm examined 
his argumentation against its possibility. They both recognized that the start-
ing point of Nelson’s criticism was the tradition of Neo-Kantian epistemology. 
The question of the concept of Nelson’s critical method was raised by Stephan 
Körner6 who associated the problem of the possibility of epistemology with 
the problem of the possibility of metaphysics. In his recently published notes, 
at the margin of his philosophy of nature, Nelson mentioned metaphysics as 
the foundation of sciences and philosophy.7 This volume contains four notes 
of Nelson’s lectures, intended to supplement and expand his work on the ph i-
losophy of nature. Metaphysics and the philosophy of nature was the leitmotif 
of Kant-Friesian thought that Leonard Nelson put into interdisciplinary re-
search programmes at the beginning of the twentieth century. His philosophy 
– as a strict science – should be based on mathematical axioms. A collection 
recently published by Andreas Brandt and Jörg Schroth also contains Nelson’s 
observations on metaphysics.8 In the Introduction to this collection, Dieter 
Birnbacher observes that, in contrast to Wittgenstein, who intended to destroy 
metaphysics as a misinterpretation of the linguistic form of expression, Nel-
                                                 
The project was financed by the National Science Centre in Poland (NCN), based on the decision 
number DEC-2013/11/B/HS1/03937. 
1 Woleński (2016). 
2 Glock (2011). 
3 Kleinknecht (2011, 1994). 
4 Schroth (1994). 
5 Waszczenko (1994); Chisholm (1979); Haller (1979). 
6 Körner (1979). 
7 Nelson (2004): 136. 
8 Nelson (2013): 25. 
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son supported the claim that metaphysics was scientifically justified.9 
The above-presented review of literature, despite several contributions to the 
problem of metaphysics, shows the overall dominant non-metaphysical inter-
pretation of the philosophy of Nelson and ignores the problem of the 
metaphysical consequences of his anti-epistemological position. Against 
the background of this literature review, I would distinguish two alternative 
interpretations of Nelson’s rejection of epistemology: either he is considered 
a skeptic in his rejection of the possibility of epistemological knowledge,  
or he is considered one who showed a different (metaphysical) way of know-
ing. I think that Nelson was not a skeptic, but rather a metaphysician. 
Methodology is based on the universally accepted determinants of the 
scientific study, such as truth, accuracy, objectivity, reliance on sources,  
the economy of description (Ockham’s razor), intersubjectivity, consistency 
and an ample justification of theorems. The main research method employed 
in this paper consists in the historical-philosophical analysis of the source ma-
terials in the original German language. That kind of content analysis consists 
in studying philosophical writings preserved in books, papers and other re-
cords. In this paper, the investigated materials were Nelson’s texts, including 
his book Über das sogenannte Erkenntnisproblem and his papers: Ist Metaphysik-
freie Naturwissenschaft möglich?, Die Unmöglichkeit der Erkenntnistheorie.10 The 
selection of the material, i.e., the analyzed texts, was determined by the sub-
ject matter of the research, namely Nelson’s concept of metaphysical know l-
edge. 
The main rationale behind the theory of knowledge is to philosophize 
according to a scientific method and explain old disputes in the strict context 
of science. The anti-metaphysical philosophy presumes that the metaphysical 
method of philosophizing is useless when compared with the epistemological 
reflection. In opposition to this approach, Nelson inquires whether the theory 
of knowledge is able to meet this objective, which is the basic intention of his 
lecture Die Unmöglichkeit der Erkenntnistheorie.11 There Nelson intends not only 
to prove the impossibility of epistemology but also to demonstrate the posi-
tive consequences that can be drawn from this impossibility. Nelson believes 
that there is a third way between the philosophical science of dogmatic meta-
physics and the anti-metaphysical philosophy construed as a science. 
                                                 
9 Birnbacher (2011): 10. 
10 Nelson (1973, 1908, 1912), all translations mine. 
11 Ibidem: 592; Nelson (1973): 92–93; Glock (2011): 57; Haller (1979): 55; Waszczenko (1994): 89. 
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As a result, Nelson calls for a new notion of proof that is not only to 
“serve to trace judgments back to other judgments” but, primarily, means be-
ing “back to intuition.”12 Accordingly, Nelson acts against the Kantian tradi-
tion that places synthetic a priori knowledge between the analytic a priori and 
the synthetic a posteriori.13 Nelson calls for a return to the original problem 
formulated by Hume, who was the first to notice that there are both non- 
-analytic and non-intuitive judgments.14 When Kant and his successors clearly 
saw the character of these ‘metaphysical’ judgments and recognised that they 
could not be reduced to the known sources of knowledge, such as concept and 
intuition, he nonetheless tried “to (epistemologically) justify the absence of 
the underlying immediate knowledge by comparison with the object.”15 There 
is a tradition of the third way in philosophy, between empiricism and ration-
alism, that started with Kant and was pursued by German idealism up to 
Neo-Kantianism. Nelson rejects this epistemological solution as an invalid 
misinterpretation and shows that a true solution can only be found in psy-
chology, understood as the science of inner experience, enabling the use of 
metaphysical judgments in reasoning and thus metaphysics as a science. 
Hence, in the background of Nelson’s argument about the impossibility of 
epistemology, we find the problem of the possibility of metaphysics. Nelson 
looks for and finds the psychological sources of metaphysical knowledge in 
inner experience. We cannot form metaphysical judgments directly on the ba-
sis of the sources of knowledge: concepts and intuitions. So there must be 
some kind of a source of metaphysical knowledge that can be found in psy-
chology as a science of inner experience. 
Epistemology as the theory of knowledge (Erkenntnistheorie) made up 
the programme of the Neo-Kantian philosophy that emerged as a reaction 
to Hegel’s system and was an instrument against materialism.16 Epistemology 
in this sense was, partly thanks to Eduard Zeller, a sign of Neo-Kantianism in 
the post-idealist polemics, especially against Hegelianism. In this context, 
epistemology means preliminary investigation of the possibilities and the lim-
its of knowledge. 
                                                 
12 Nelson (1912): 605; Chisholm (1979): 39, 43. 
13 Nelson (1912): 606; Nelson (1973): 94–99; Körner (1979): 2; Kleinknecht (1994): 27. 
14 Nelson (1908): 253–257. 
15 Nelson (1912): 606; Westermann (1994): 110; Schroth (1994): 129. 
16 Köhnke (1981): 208–209. 
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The dominant Neo-Kantian theory of knowledge, represented by the 
Marburg and Baden Schools, was founded in opposition to the psychological 
tendency in epistemology. While in the School of Fries the critique of reason 
was still identical with rational (philosophical) psychology, in those years 
a current emerged, inspired by the British Empiricism, that to a greater or 
lesser extent identified epistemology with empirical psychology. This theory 
of knowledge should be called, strictly speaking, psychologism. Influenced by 
Friedrich Heinrich Jacobi, Johann Gottfried von Herder and Friedrich Eduard 
Beneke aimed at psychological epistemology, which would characterise the 
foundation of all knowledge as strictly scientific psychology. A similar con-
ception of epistemology can be found in the works of Hermann Ludwig Fer-
dinand von Helmholtz, Wilhelm Maximilian Wundt and Carl Stumpf, as well 
as John Stuart Mill and William James. In contrast, Fries’ psychologism was 
only ostensible (pseudo-psychologism). 
The Neo-Kantian methodological objection to psychologistic epistemol-
ogy suggests that psychology as an empirical science uncritically assumes the 
validity of objective knowledge. The validity of knowledge cannot be reduced 
to the psychological genesis of knowledge. According to Hermann Cohen, 
epistemology consists in a theory of pure thinking that is independent of 
any influences external to reason.17 Wilhelm Windelband understands that 
knowledge must be based on the highest and psychologically non- 
-relativizable values (norms) that epistemology should reveal. Epistemology 
in the Neo-Kantian sense answers the question “whether, to what extent and 
in what sense human knowledge guarantees transcendent truth, which is pre-
sented as an indefinite presupposition of all pre-philosophical knowledge.”18 
The main schools of Neo-Kantianism acknowledge that epistemology cannot 
proceed empirically and that, in other words, what is a priori cannot be 
known a posteriori. 
After the rejection of epistemology, Nelson turned to psychology. It is 
not clear what Nelson meant by his reference to psychology. This point is es-
pecially important since exactly in Nelson’s time practically all important 
Neo-Kantians, like Herman Cohen, Paul Natorp, Ernst Cassirer, Wilhelm 
Windelband and Heinrich Rickert, were anti-psychologists. Moreover, such 
enormously influential philosophers as Gottlob Frege and Edmund Husserl 
were radical anti-psychologists. It is worth investigating how Nelson’s “psy-
                                                 
17 Cohen (1914): 13. 
18 Windelband (1912): 17, translation mine. 
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chologism” related to the mainstream anti-psychologism of his age and how it 
is possible that he is considered both a Neo-Kantian and a psychologistic 
thinker at the same time. 
Nelson saw himself as a follower of Fries, and this philosophy was the 
source of his “psychologism.” The question of the understanding of psycho l-
ogy must, therefore, be raised at first in relation to Fries, which requires a new 
anthropological grounding in philosophy.19 This anthropology was later con-
sidered by his opponent, Kuno Fischer, a sign of psychologism.20 In his view, 
philosophy after Kant faced the choice between two alternatives: either meta-
physics or psychology. For Fries, the knowledge of human reason can only be 
self-knowledge, self-observation, psychology and anthropological criticism. 
Fries’ anthropological criticism was formed in opposition to the metaphysics 
of German Idealism presented by Karl Leonhard Reinhold, Johann Gottlieb 
Fichte and Friedrich Wilhelm Joseph von Schelling. The answer to the ques-
tion about Fries’ psychologism can be found in the way he understood logic, 
especially in his distinction between the demonstrative (philosophical)  logic 
and the anthropological logic: “the first is the science of the analytic know l-
edge, or of the laws of the thinkability of a thing, the second is the science of 
nature and of the essence of our understanding.”21 Fries, therefore, does not 
reduce the whole logic to psychology and thus he is not a psychologistic 
thinker in the strict sense. Only if we understand psychologism generally, as 
any discourse about the human spirit, can Fries’ philosophy definitely qualify 
as a psychologistic position. 
In this sense, Fries’ philosophical anthropology is nothing but the study 
of human cognitive faculty and corresponds to what the representatives of 
British Empiricism called a study of human understanding; whereas Kant 
called it a critique of reason.22 The subject matter of these studies is an area of 
the inner experience of humans, their knowledge of the inner world. Fries as-
sumed that a psychological analysis of inner experience had to be preceded by 
a detection of a priori truths, and transcendental deduction was the justifica-
tion for this psychological analysis. Representatives of the first Friesian 
School, such as Ernst Sigismund Mirbt and Ernst Friedrich Apelt, but also 
Beneke and Arthur Schopenhauer, held similar beliefs. 
                                                 
19 Fries (1807); Beiser (2014): 23–53. 
20 Fischer (1887): 11. 
21 Fries (1811): 4, all translations mine. 
22 Meyer (1870): 12–13. 
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To this one can reply that Kant did not want to give his critique an an-
thropological character. But we should bear in mind that, to quote Kuno 
Fischer, “whether the critique of reason should be metaphysical or anthropo-
logical is the genuine problem which has been unavoidable in the history of 
German philosophy since Kant.”23 Is it not an error to consider that the a pri-
ori cannot be known in an a posteriori manner? This error was noticed by Jür-
gen Bona Meyer.24 Kant talked about empirical knowledge, but he did not de-
rive it from empirical perception, like Hume and Locke. Instead, he deduced 
it from the transcendental principles of the possibility of experience. Conse-
quently, he could not connect sensibility and intellect in one reason. There-
fore, his successors, such as Fichte, were skeptical about empirical psychology 
and internal self-observation. This fault was noticed by Fries and later by Nel-
son when they turned towards psychology. 
In opposition to generally accepted views, Nelson is of the opinion that 
Fries had a basically negative attitude towards psychologism and a positive 
attitude towards the transcendental method: “Fries is far from being a fo l-
lower of the genetic-psychological method; rather, he is its decisive oppo-
nent.”25 Nelson cites a number of examples where Fries criticised the psycho-
genetic method. Like Fries and Bona Meyer, Nelson believes that psychologi-
cally understood deduction must be regarded as the essence of Kant's phi-
losophy. For this reason, he thinks of metaphysical principles as closely re-
lated to psychology. The latter deals with intuition as one of two basic sources 
of knowledge. The primacy of intuition in contrast to reflection means that it 
can never be untrue as a kind of immediate knowledge. 
Nelson connects Fries' objections against the transcendental prejudice with 
the misunderstanding of deduction; according to him, the fundamental mistake of 
post-Kantian dogmatism consisted in the conflation of principles: psychological 
and philosophical: 
Transzendental nannte KANT die Untersuchung des Grundes der Möglichkeit 
synthetischer Urteile a priori. Der Gegenstand der transzendentalen Untersuchung 
[…] sind also Erkenntnisse a priori. Erkenntnisse aber erkennen wir überhaupt nur 
durch innere Erfahrung. Die transzendentale Erkenntnis der Kritik ist also 
offenbar Erkenntnis aus innerer Erfahrung. 
                                                 
23 Fischer (1862): 101, translation mine. 
24 Meyer (1870): 11–12. 
25 Nelson (1970b): 91, all translations mine. 
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[Kant called investigations into the grounds of the possibility of synthetic a priori 
judgments ‘transcendental’. The object of the transcendental investigation […] is 
thus a priori knowledge. However, we can arrive at cognitions only by inner expe-
rience. The transcendental critical knowledge is therefore obviously cognition that 
derives from the inner sense.]26 
Nelson regards transcendental criticism as an empirical science which deals, 
however, with the a priori knowledge. One must, therefore, distinguish exact-
ly the subject of transcendental criticism from the content because they are not 
similar: The object of criticism is the philosophical knowledge as a kind of  
a priori knowledge, whereas its content is the transcendental knowledge that 
has a psychological character. The transcendental means a kind of 
metaphilosophical knowledge which can be known only a posteriori in inner 
experience, in contrast to the a priori knowledge of philosophy itself.  
The psychological approach in Neo-Kantianism was represented not 
only by Nelson, but also by other representatives of the Neo-Kantian direction 
in psychology, namely Hans Cornelius and the already mentioned Fries and 
Bona Meyer. For example, in his Psychologie als Erfahrungswissenschaft, Corne-
lius says that psychology is “the only possible foundation of all philosophy.”27 
Husserl directly accused Cornelius of psychologism.28 The psychological 
approach was appreciated not only by Neo-Kantians of the psychological di-
rection, but also, for example, by Alois Riehl, a representative of the realistic 
direction in Neo-Kantianism. However, Riehl rejects any psychological confu-
sion between the logical and psychological ways of considering the concept of 
the a priori.29 Psychologism was thus present in the broadly understood Neo- 
-Kantianism. Nevertheless, the question of the nature of Neo-Kantian psy-
chology is beyond the scope of this paper. We have to go back to metaphysics.  
In fact, attempts were made to solve the problem of the possibility of meta-
physics, resp. the so-called metaphysical judgments, by its reduction to the known 
sources of knowledge. If reflection is to be the source of knowledge of metaphysi-
cal judgments, we get metaphysical logicism, and if it is to be intuition, we arrive 
at metaphysical intuitionism. The Third Way between logicism and intuitionism is 
a rejection of the two sources of knowledge for metaphysical judgments and a rec-
                                                 
26 Nelson (1970a): 41, all translations mine. 
27 Cornelius (1897): 7, translation mine. 
28 Husserl (1901): 206. 
29 Moog (1922): 195. 
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ognition that metaphysical judgments have no source of knowledge, as argued by 
metaphysical empiricism. It is a generally accepted belief that apart from the posi-
tions of metaphysical logicism, intuitionism and empiricism, there are no other 
possible solutions to the problem of the possibility of metaphysics. Nelson, how-
ever, tries to prove the logical incompleteness of the distinction between intuition 
and reflection in order to show the possibility of a fourth solution to this problem. 
If we take intuition to be identical with unreflected knowledge, it must mean, of 
course, that non-intuitive knowledge can only come from concepts through reflec-
tion and vice versa. But Nelson notices the following linguistic usage suggesting 
the opposite: 
Nach dem allgemeinen Sprachgebrauch versteht man unter ‚Anschauung‘ eine 
unmittelbar bewußte Erkenntnis. Aber nicht jede unmittelbare Erkenntnis braucht 
eine unmittelbar bewußte Erkenntnis zu sein. Es liegt kein Widerspruch in der 
Annahme, daß eine Erkenntnis, die nicht aus der Reflexion entspringt, uns nur 
durch Vermittlung der Reflexion zu Bewußtsein kommt. Unmittelbarkeit der 
Erkenntnis und Unmittelbarkeit des Bewußtseins um die Erkenntnis ist nämlich 
logisch zweierlei. 
[Following the common language, it is understood that ‘intuition’ is an immediate 
conscious cognition. But not any immediate cognition needs to be an immediate 
conscious cognition. There is no contradiction in the assumption that knowledge 
that does not arise from reflection comes to our consciousness through the media-
tion of reflection. For the immediacy of cognition and the immediacy of conscious-
ness to the knowledge is logically twofold.]30 
So Nelson argues that a distinction should be made between the immediacy of 
knowledge and the immediacy of consciousness. They have a different mean-
ing and, therefore, cannot be equated. If we make this distinction, the distinc-
tion between reflection and intuition must mean that the account of the 
sources of knowledge is incomplete. 
Nelson is well-known for his close connection with a group of mathe-
maticians and scientists in Göttingen. This group included: David Hilbert, Fe-
lix Klein, Hermann Minkowski, Carl Runge, Max Born, Arthur Kronfeld and 
Otto Meyerhof.31 The significance of this circle comes from the fact that Nel-
son had a problem with his extraordinary professorship, which he received 
                                                 
30 Nelson (1912): 608. 
31 Noras (2012): 380. 
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ten years after his habilitation (postdoctoral degree), only thanks to Hilbert’s 
support. Hilbert’s geometrical axiomatics was a model for the mathematical 
component of Nelson’s critical mathematics.32 Nelson's critical mathematics 
was based on Fries’s writings, especially on his Mathematische Naturphilosophie 
(1822). However, Hesseberg and Nelson were particularly inspired in their 
work by Hilbert’s Grundlagen der Geometrie. The influences are mutual because 
“Hilbert considered the regressive method important in mathematical prac-
tice, especially for justifying axioms and other general principles of science”.33 
This regressive method was introduced to mathematics by Nelson. Clearly,  
a discussion of Nelson’s metaphysical ideas in the context of their connection 
with science and mathematics could be important, but it definitely exceeds the 
scope of this paper. 
In this connection, we should also mention philosophers of science, 
such as Karl Popper. In the context of Fries’s psychologism, Popper popular-
ized the term “Friesean Trilemma” which means that in philosophical justifi-
cation we should choose between dogmatism, infinite regress and psychologi-
cal foundationism. For Volker Peckhaus, it was a harbinger of Hans Albert’s 
“Münchhausen Trilemma”.34 The cause of Friesean Trilemma was formulated 
not by Popper, but actually by Leonard Nelson in his study Über das 
sogenannte Erkenntnisproblem.35 Nelson interpreted Fries as a supporter of the 
option which argued for the immediate self-knowledge of human reason. The 
liaison between Popper and Nelson was Julius Kraft, who was a friend of both 
philosophers. Nelson’s connection with Popper’s philosophy of science is cer-
tainly interesting but it requires a separate study on the “Friesean Trilemma.”  
Nelson was of the opinion that non-intuitive immediate cognition extended 
the classical distinction and thus logically justified the distinction in a new way. 
Following this extension, like Hume, he asked about the accuracy of various logi-
cally possible psychological theories. This question goes beyond a purely logical 
criticism of the classical transcendental philosophy, and is directed at the testi-
mony of inner experience. If the sources of metaphysical judgments can be found 
neither in reflection nor in intuition, we have two possibilities for their rejection: 
either the anti-metaphysical empiricism of Hume and Mach,36 or the exclusiveness 
                                                 
32 Peckhaus (1990): 158–159. 
33 Woleński (2016): 385. 
34 Peckhaus (2011): 109. 
35 Nelson (1973): § 152. 
36 Nelson (1908): 287–291. 
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of reflection and intuition as sources of knowledge and the assumption of the pos-
sibility of non-intuitive immediate knowledge. This first attempt at a solution 
failed, and Hume, a metaphysical skeptic, answered in the negative. Instead of 
justifying metaphysical judgments, he took on a task of providing a psychological 
explanation of these judgments to answer the question of the possibility of their 
being a product of a blind mechanism of association.37 Nelson was of the opinion 
that Hume’s judgments were reducible to the psychological principle of the an-
ticipation of similar cases which was opposed to the laws of association.38 Hume 
invoked Aristotle’s primary association laws that explain associations during 
learning on the basis of space and temporal proximity (contiguity), equality and 
contrast between two events. This concept of association is based on the memory 
of learned connections and, therefore, is quite a problematic idea. In contrast, the 
anticipation of similar cases has an associative character and requires a kind of 
certainty or a minimum of probability. Hume was aware of this difficulty and, 
therefore, tried to present it only in terms of gradation between problematic 
and assertoric ideas, so that the two ideas are different only because of their differ-
ent degrees of clarity. Nelson held a different opinion: Hume's empirical hypothe-
sis of gradation between the problematic and assertoric ideas is wrong because it 
contradicts the facts of self-observation. Nelson noticed the problem in the judg-
ment about the necessary connection of things: 
Allerdings muß sich jede Verknüpfung von Vorstellungen durch die Gesetze der 
Assoziation erklären lassen. Was es hier zu erklären gilt, ist aber nicht eine 
Verknüpfung von Vorstellungen, sondern die Vorstellung der Verknüpfung. 
[However, each connection of ideas must be explained by the laws of association. 
What needs to be explained here is not a connection of ideas, but the idea of con-
nection.]39 
Nelson saw the association itself as relatively unproblematic and drew atten-
tion to the imaginary idea of connections between ideas. This idea of connec-
tion must arise beyond mere associations and, consequently, it requires a di f-
ferent type of the source of knowledge. 
In his psychological critique of empiricism, Nelson went further than the 
empirical critique of metaphysical logicism and metaphysical mysticism, towards 
                                                 
37 Nelson (1912): 610. 
38 Nelson (1908): 257–261. 
39 Nelson (1912): 612. 
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the fourth theory of criticism. The consequence of criticism is, therefore, not a re-
jection of metaphysical knowledge, but the adoption of non-intuitive immediate 
knowledge that can form the basis of metaphysics. The logical criticism of possible 
decisions concerning the problem of metaphysics saved Nelson from a contradic-
tory attempt at an epistemological solution of the problem and, on the other hand, 
from a hasty withdrawal from a seemingly impossible logical way. If we are to 
admit the possibility of metaphysics, we still need a criterion for verifying the cor-
rectness of metaphysical assertions, but we cannot find it in the theory of knowl-
edge, as it can lie neither in reflection nor in intuition. For this reason, we try to 
find this criterion in metaphysics itself, which must mean a defeat, 
[...] da die Metaphysik den Grund der Rechtmäßigkeit ihrer Urteile offenbar 
ebensowenig in sich selbst enthalten kann wie irgendeine andere Wissenschaft, so 
mußte man diesen Grund in einer anderen, höheren Wissenschaft suchen, die aber 
freilich ihrerseits ihren Gehalt ebensowenig auf der bloßen Reflexion oder der 
Anschauung schöpfen durfte wie die Metaphysik selbst und von der es daher 
nicht verwunderlich ist, daß noch niemand ihrer Bearbeiter über ihre eigene 
Herkunft Aufschluß geben konnte. 
[[...] because metaphysics obviously cannot contain the reason for the legitimacy of 
its propositions in itself as any other science. This is why this reason has to be 
found in a different, higher science, which obviously could not create its content 
on the mere reflection or intuition as metaphysics itself, and therefore it is not sur-
prising that none of its authors could explain its origin.]40 
The essence of the problem is still in the confusion between knowledge and 
judgment, so we are unsuccessfully looking for the justification of metaphysi-
cal judgments in non-metaphysical immediate knowledge. If judgment is dis-
tinguished from immediate knowledge, the reason for the validity of meta-
physical judgments should be sought not in metaphysical judgments but in 
the immediate ones. Nelson argues that the basis of metaphysical judgments 
is not in a higher science, but just in immediate metaphysical knowledge.  
This immediate metaphysical knowledge, however, has a special non- 
-intuitive and unconscious character that Nelson introduces in the following way: 
Denn wenn uns auch der Grund der metaphysischen Urteile in einer 
unmittelbaren Erkenntnis gegeben ist, so kommt uns diese doch nicht unmittelbar 
                                                 
40 Ibidem: 614. 
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zu Bewußtsein, derart, daß es möglich wäre, sie ohne weiteres mit den 
metaphysischen Urteilen zu vergleichen, um diese zu begründen. 
[Because when we have been given an immediate cognition of the reason for 
metaphysical judgments, we draw this, yet not immediately to consciousness, so 
that it would be possible to compare them easily with the metaphysical judgments 
to justify it.]41 
Direct metaphysical knowledge, fundamental for metaphysics, differs from con-
scious perception in the nature of its psychological phenomenon. The difference 
has a methodological character as we need a special non-epistemological science 
to justify metaphysical judgments that could show the basis of metaphysical 
judgments. For this basic methodological reason, Nelson concludes that science is 
fundamental for metaphysics: 
Eben darum ist auch der empirische und psychologische Charakter dieser 
Wissenschaft mit der rationalen und metaphysischen Natur der durch sie zu 
begründenden Sätze sehr wohl verträglich. Der Grund der metaphysischen Sätze 
liegt ja nicht in den Sätzen dieser psychologischen Kritik, sondern in der 
unmittelbaren metaphysischen Erkenntnis. 
[Precisely for this reason, the empirical and psychological character of this science 
is very well tolerated as well as the rational and metaphysical nature of their fun-
damental propositions. The reason for the metaphysical propositions is not in the 
propositions of the psychological criticism, but in immediate metaphysical knowl-
edge.]42 
This science can be a kind of metaphysical psychology that comprises two op-
posing, rational and empirical, elements. This opposition is possible only if 
we go beyond the dichotomy between reflection and intuition. 
Nelson explains the relationship between metaphysical propositions and 
their psychological criticism by an analogy with the improvability of the parallel 
postulate and the parallel postulate itself. The parallel postulate is known as the 
fifth postulate of Euclid, and its insolvability was first recognized by Carl Frie-
drich Gauss. On the one hand, we have a true proposition from the system of ge-
ometry and, on the other, a true proposition from its criticism, which is not a basis 
                                                 
41 Ibidem: 615; Kleinknecht (2011): 92. 
42 Nelson (1912): 615–616. 
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of the parallel axiom itself, but has it only as its object. Nelson draws an analogy 
with the following example shown in the critique of metaphysical propositions: 
Nehmen wir z. B. den Grundsatz der Kausalität; nennen wir ihn C. Dann beweist 
die psychologische Kritik den Satz D: Es existiert eine nicht-anschauliche 
unmittelbare Erkenntnis, die den Grund von C enthält. C ist ein Satz des Systems 
der Metaphysik und als solcher rationale, D ein Satz der psychologischen Kritik 
und als solcher empirisch. D enthält nicht den Grund von C, sondern hat ihn nur 
zum Gegenstand. 
[We call the principle of causality, for example, a statement C. Then the psycho-
logical critique demonstrates a statement D: There is non-intuitive immediate 
knowledge, which contains the ground of the statement C. C is a statement of the 
system of metaphysics and as such it is rational, D is a statement of psychological 
criticism and is empirical as such. D does not contain the basis of C, but has it only 
as an object.]43 
Thus, Nelson distinguishes two kinds of relationship between propositions: 
a basic relationship and an object relationship, which cannot be equated. In 
Nelson’s opinion, a basic relationship is a link between non-intuitive immedi-
ate knowledge and the principle of causality, so that the principle is justified 
only by this knowledge. Propositions about the basic relationship belong in 
a rational way to the system of metaphysics. Irrespective of that, psychologi-
cal criticism uses the object relationship and determines the existence or solv-
ability of propositions in the empirical way, so that it has this principle only 
as an object. If we draw a distinction between metaphysical propositions and 
their criticism, the critical findings concerning the impossibility of metaphys-
ics will not deny the correctness of its principles. 
As a consequence, Nelson underlines, from the standpoint of criticism, 
the positive and negative role of “psychology for the establishment of meta-
physics.” The positive role lies in the fact that psychology can detect the exis-
tence of non-intuitive immediate knowledge as the basis of metaphysical 
principles. We obtain principles of metaphysics from a general psychological 
criticism, by which we can at least exclude all those that are a priori contradic-
tory with psychological facts.44 This psychology can, therefore, compare 
metaphysical principles with facts because each metaphysics, usually uncon-
                                                 
43 Ibidem: 616. 
44 Ibidem: 616–617. 
Tomasz Kubalica ◦ Leonard Nelson and Metaphysical Knowledge against the Neo-Kantian... 
 78 
sciously, presumes that its sources of knowledge can be verified or falsified 
by comparison with psychological facts. With this possibility of logical and 
psychological critique of metaphysical principles, their scientific treatment 
becomes more accessible, which enables the “unanimous and fruitful scientific 
work” on common problems and by means of a common method rather than 
“haphazard and barren dogmatic disputes in philosophy.”  
Earlier work has shown the importance of Nelson’s reflection on meta-
physical knowledge for his rejection of the possibility of epistemological 
knowledge in the historical sense of the term. The basic interpretations, alter-
native between the epistemological skepticism and the critical new way, point 
towards different metaphysical ways of philosophical knowledge. However, 
these studies are rather brief and do not focus specifically on the question of 
the possibility of epistemology itself. In this study, we have examined Nel-
son’s arguments about metaphysical knowledge only on the basis of the 
source materials in the original German language. We have found that Nel-
son’s intention was not only to prove the impossibility of epistemology but 
also to demonstrate the positive consequences that can be drawn from this 
impossibility. These findings confirm that the stereotypes and simplifications 
concerning the epistemological nature of Neo-Kantian philosophy must be 
rejected. In addition, from his critical perspective, Nelson underlines the im-
portance of psychology for the establishment of metaphysics. This study, 
therefore, indicates that Nelson’s critique of the possibility of epistemology 
has its basis in his conception of philosophical psychology and its conse-
quences in his metaphysical position. Our results provide compelling evi-
dence for the metaphysical consequences of Nelson’s position and suggest 
that this approach is important in relation to the Neo-Kantian background of 
his philosophy. However, some limitations should be noted, because our hy-
potheses have only historical support. Therefore, more work is needed to 
evaluate the logical consequences of Nelson’s metaphysics. 
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